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Since investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) was introduced in international 
investment agreements (IIAs) some 40 years ago, it has experienced five fundamental 
developments: 
 
• The number of investment disputes has risen significantly 
 
At the end of 2011, at least 450 treaty-based investor-state disputes were publicly 
known -- approximately 6.5 times more than the 67 known cases ten years earlier. 
 
• The nature of the disputes has changed 
 
Foreign investors increasingly challenge host countries’ regulatory activities, such as 
environmental policies, energy policies, health policies, and policies related to 
economic crises. 
 
• Investment disputes are becoming more complex 
 
Arbitrators need to decide difficult legal issues related to, inter alia, indirect 
expropriations and the meaning and scope of fair and equitable treatment. 
 
• IIA provisions are interpreted expansively and sometimes incoherently 
 
Different arbitration tribunals have interpreted IIA provisions differently. There 
already exists a list of the most controversial or surprising investment awards.1 
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• Developed countries have become defendants in ISDS 
 
In recent years, more developed countries have been drawn into investment disputes. 
As of end 2011, at least 18 developed countries had faced investment arbitration -- as 
compared to 55 developing countries and 16 economies in transition. 
 
Governments face a dilemma. While many governments consider ISDS a key element 
of international investment protection, ISDS is becoming increasingly risky. For one, 
governments’ risk of being sued by foreign investors is growing. Second, when a 
dispute arises, the defence requires enormous resources; if a case is lost, damages can 
be very high. Third, governments live with an unpredictable arbitration practice 
without having the legal safety net of an appellate body like in the WTO. Fourth, 
complex domestic legal issues reaching beyond international investment law are 
examined by international arbitrators. Fifth, as more disputes are directed against 
countries with highly developed domestic judicial systems, governments need to ask 
themselves how positive discrimination of foreign investors in respect of ISDS can be 
justified. 
 
Most countries are following a “wait and see” approach, not (yet) considering it 
necessary significantly to change their traditional approach to ISDS. Some countries, 
in particular Canada and the US, have taken a more defensive approach in IIAs to 
preserve domestic regulatory space, mainly by clarifying treaty provisions, 
introducing exception clauses and limiting access to ISDS.2 Others have taken more 
radical steps. For example, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela denounced their ICSID 
memberships and have started to terminate their BITs. Australia intends no longer to 
include ISDS provisions in its IIAs, while Ecuador and South Africa are reviewing 
their BITs with the objective of renegotiation or termination. 
 
Overall, the existing ISDS system is no longer recognized as an indispensable core 
part of IIAs. Discontent is not limited to a few developing countries, but has spread to 
G-20 countries, including some of the BRICs. Further momentum could jeopardize 
the ISDS system as a whole. 
 
Reforming the ISDS system poses the difficulty that most countries are bound by a 
network of thousands of IIAs containing the traditional ISDS model. Successful 
renegotiation and the achievement of a “better” treaty are in no way guaranteed. 
 
A careful evolution of the ISDS system requires a balanced approach that recognizes 
the legitimate interests of both host countries and foreign investors. Numerous reform 
suggestions have been made. The governments’ dilemma described above could be 
addressed particularly through the following policy options: 
 
Differentiate between treaty partners. Not every IIA may require ISDS provisions 
allowing access to international arbitration.3 It is doubtful there is a case for 
international arbitration in IIAs when contracting parties share the view that all 
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countries involved have highly competent, neutral and efficient domestic judicial 
systems. More consideration should be given to improvements in individual countries. 
 
Clarify the scope of individual treaty provisions. Countries may wish to reduce their 
exposure to ISDS by clarifying the content of specific IIA provisions, especially those 
that -- because of vague treaty language -- are prone to broad and inconsistent 
interpretation by tribunals, such as the provisions on indirect expropriation and fair 
and equitable treatment. 
 
Consider an appeals mechanism. The establishment of an appeals mechanism in BITs 
beyond the existing annulment procedures in ICSID -- although institution-wise a 
challenging task -- would substantially contribute to ensuring coherent interpretations 
of IIA provisions, increasing legal predictability and stability and strengthening the 
legitimacy of ISDS.4 In order not to lose a significant advantage of ISDS -- the 
relative rapidity of arbitration -- it would be important to establish time limits within 
which an award would have to be rendered.5 
 
The growing number of ISDS cases highlights benefits and deficiencies of 
international investment arbitration. Governments’ discontent with the functionality of 
the current system calls for careful reform, limiting the exposure of host countries 
while strengthening the rule of law and recognizing foreign investors’ right to be 
protected. 
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